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Abstract: This paper estimates matching functions to measure search frictions in the 
Japanese labor market and presents determinants of search duration to explain the effect 
of unemployment benefits on a job seeker’s behavior. We employ administrative micro 
data that track the job search process of individuals who left or lost their job in August 
2005 and subsequently registered at their local public employment service. Our finding 
is that the matching function would exhibit decreasing returns-to-scale for job seekers 
and vacancies, rather than constant return-to-scale. We also find that generous 
unemployment benefits lengthen (shorten) the duration of job search for job seekers 
who voluntarily (involuntarily) leave employment. 
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1. Introduction 
The matching function defines the flow of new hires as a function of the stocks of 
individual job seekers and job vacancies in firms. This particular function is very useful 
for embodying unemployment in models with search frictions because of the omission 
of the microfoundations for the underlying frictions when constructing these models. As 
a result, there are many empirical studies that estimate the matching function to measure 
the extent of search frictions in the labor market—see Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) 
for a comprehensive survey. 
These studies typically employ aggregate data at a yearly, quarterly, or monthly 
frequency. Needless to say, they help us better understand the job search process 
between job seekers and firms with job vacancies, but the use of aggregated data 
sometimes causes serious aggregation bias to arise.1
Of these, Petrongolo (2001) is the first study known to investigate returns-to-scale in 
 To correct for it, micro data that 
track the search process for each individual are more appropriate. However, to the best 
of our knowledge, there are few studies that estimate matching functions using micro 
data, with the exception of Nickell (1979), Atkinson et al. (1984), and Petrongolo 
(2001). 
                                                 
1 As an alternative, Coles and Smith (1996) and Anderson and Burgess (2000) employ state-level 
data. Here, the variance in state-specific factors reduces omitted variable bias. This provides more 
precise estimates of the elasticity of matching formations to the stocks of job seekers and 
vacancies. 
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the matching formation using individual data.2
In our study, we employ two large sets of administrative micro data from the 
Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, Report on Unemployment Insurance 
and Report on Employment Services. Both sets of data include all individuals 
throughout Japan who left or lost their job in August 2005. The former data set includes 
the job seeker’s job history, including previous wage and the precise date when the 
individual resigned or lost his/her job, while the latter data set includes the job seeker’s 
individual characteristics and details about the job search process. Fortunately, 
individuals bear the same identification number in each data set, and this allows us to 
merge the two sets of data. We then obtain history-based information on when 
individuals quit or lost their old job, when they registered with the local employment 
service office and started to look for a new job, and when they found a job and exited 
 Accordingly, in the spirit of Petrongolo 
(2001), this paper estimates the matching function to gauge the extent of frictions in the 
Japanese labor market using micro data collected from job seekers with the assistance of 
the Japanese public employment service office. In our approach, we use two different 
segmentations to define the size of the local market faced by each individual job seeker, 
namely, the prefectural area where the job seeker lives and the smaller area administered 
by a local public employment service office in which the job seeker registers for 
employment. 
                                                 
2 Nickell (1979) and Atkinson et al. (1984) add labor market tightness as an explanatory variable to 
estimate the exit rate from unemployment. However, they do not address returns-to-scale in the 
matching formation. 
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from unemployment. 
These administrative micro data sets have three main merits. The first is that, as 
mentioned above, we do not need to consider the aggregation bias that arises when data 
at the yearly, quarterly, or monthly frequency are used. The second is that because the 
data were collected for administrative purposes, respondents are not able to self-select; 
that is, the selection bias problem does not arise. The final merit is that unlike interview 
surveys, where it is usually impossible to cover large geographical areas 
comprehensively, the data include job seekers from all of the employment service 
offices located throughout Japan. Accordingly, there is no geographical bias. 
This paper also estimates the duration analysis to address the effect of the generosity 
of unemployment benefits on a job seeker’s search behavior. As shown in the 
implications of a well-known job search model (Lippman and McCall, 1976), generous 
unemployment benefits increase the job seeker’s reservation wage, thus leading to an 
increase in the duration of unemployment. In the Japanese welfare system, the 
generosity of unemployment benefits varies according to age, the insured period, and 
whether applicants quit their employment position voluntarily or lost their job 
involuntarily. These differences identify the extent to which the generosity of 
unemployment benefits prevents job seekers from exiting from unemployment. 
The main contribution of this paper is that we employ large and specialized micro 
data sets for the first time in Japan when evaluating the individual job search process. 
This allows us to measure more precisely the extent to which search frictions prevent a 
job seeker and a job vacancy from forming a match. It also allows us to assess the effect 
of the generosity of unemployment benefits on a job seeker’s search behavior, 
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controlling for the problems of aggregation, selection, and geographical bias. 
The main findings are as follows. First, regardless of whether we define the local 
labor market where a job seeker is active as the prefectural area where they live, or the 
more narrowly defined area administered by a local public employment service office 
where they register for employment, the matching function would exhibit decreasing 
returns-to-scale with respect to both job seekers and job vacancies, rather than constant 
return-to-scale. A possible intuition underlying this result is that a larger market 
apparently lowers average productivity at least partly because of the increasing 
formation of job mismatch. Lower productivity then shifts downward the wage offer 
distribution, thereby discouraging job seekers from forming a match with an 
encountered firm. There is also a countereffect in that lower productivity decreases the 
job seeker’s reservation wage, and this tends to increase the probability of exit from 
unemployment. 
Our estimates imply that the former effect dominates the latter, resulting in 
decreasing returns-to-scale in the matching function. This result is consistent with Kano 
and Ohta (2005) and Sasaki (2007), though both of these studies estimated the matching 
function using aggregate data. One implication is that our estimate does not ensure that 
a unique unemployment rate exists along the steady-state growth path (Mortensen and 
Pissarides, 1998; Pissarides, 2000). According to a parametric estimate of the duration 
analysis using a Weibull distribution, the hazard rate is then negatively dependent, 
implying that the longer-term unemployed are less likely to exit from unemployment, in 
part because of skill depreciation. 
We also find, as one would expect, that more generous unemployment benefits extend 
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the search duration for job seekers who quit their job voluntarily. However, we also find 
that job seekers who lost their job involuntarily are more likely to return to work, even 
though they are eligible to receive more generous unemployment benefits. This may be 
because those who lose their job against their will may have a stronger preference for 
work, and therefore, they are eager to exit from unemployment as soon as possible, 
despite the generous provision of unemployment benefits. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
econometric specifications. Section 3 describes the two data sets obtained from the 
Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare and defines search duration and the 
covariates. Section 4 reports the estimated results, and Section 5 provides some 
concluding remarks. 
2. Econometric specifications 
In this section, and following Petrongolo (2001), we construct the estimating equation 
of an individual-level matching function when microdata are used. Many earlier studies 
estimate the matching function to measure the extent of search frictions in the labor 
market.3
                                                 
3 There is an additional literature that addresses the issue of non-random matching. For example, 
Coles and Smith (1998) and Coles and Petrongolo (2008) estimate a stock-flow matching model and 
show that this performs better than the random matching function.  
 Importantly, these studies generally employ aggregate data on job seekers, job 
vacancies, and matched jobs (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). Because the micro data 
capturing the individual matching process are available, we can estimate the 
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returns-to-scale in the matching formation and the effects of unemployment benefits and 
their provision period on the exit rate from unemployment. 
A standard matching function is: Mj = Aȷ�UjβVjγ, 
where Mj is a measure of job matches formed during a given length of time in area j, Uj 
is a measure of unemployed in area j, and Vj is a measure of job vacancies in area j. The 
parameters β and γ indicate the elasticity of Mj with respect to Uj and Vj, respectively. Aȷ�  is a measure of the extent of area-specific search technology and/or the average 
search effort put into job search by the unemployed living in area j. We assume this 
function is increasing in both arguments. Note that employed job seekers are not 
included in Uj; that is, a group of job seekers consists only of unemployed workers, as 
explained later in detail. Similarly, Vj excludes nonregistered vacancies, and Mj 
represents the number of matches only between Uj and Vj. Therefore, we do not need to 
address the problem of endogeneity that results from job competition between 
unemployed and employed job searchers and vacancy competition between registered 
and nonregistered firms.4
                                                 
4 Broersma and van Ours (1999) and Mumford and Smith (1999) argue the need to correct for the 
bias caused by unobserved employed job searchers. Anderson and Burgess (2000) address 
endogenous on-the-job search as a source of estimation bias (or job competition). Fahr and Sunde 
(2005) deal with the endogeneity problem caused by alternative vacancy postings (or vacancy 
competition). Finally, Sunde (2007) uses a different approach to identify the bias caused by both 
job and vacancy competition. 
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The average exit rate of an unemployed worker living in area j is then: 
λ�(Uj, Vj) = Aȷ�Uj−(1−β)Vjγ = exp�lnAȷ� − (1 − β)lnUj + γlnVj�. 
Note that this function is nonnegative. The exit rate of an unemployed individual i is 
then given by: 
λ�Uj, Vj, Xi, Zj� = A�Xi, Zj�Uj−(1−β)Vjγ = exp�lnA�Xi, Zj� − (1 − β)lnUj + γlnVj�, 
where Xi is a vector of individual characteristics, and Zj is a vector of area-specific 
characteristics. 
We employ a parametric estimation method with a Weibull distribution and a 
semiparametric estimation method with a proportional hazard model (Cox, 1972) to 
estimate the search duration. The hazard rate is thus: h�ti; Uj, Vj, Xi, Zj� = λ�Uj, Vj, Xi, Zj�φ(ti), 
where φ(ti) > 0 represents the baseline hazard function common to all individuals. An 
individual hazard therefore differs proportionally by λ. In the parametric estimate with a 
Weibull distribution, φ(ti) = αtiα–1 where α is a parameter indicating the extent of 
duration dependence.5
Many earlier empirical studies have been preoccupied with the nature of equilibrium. 
One issue that needs to be considered in the estimation of a matching function is to test 
whether the matching function exhibits constant returns-to-scale with respect to Uj and 
Vj, implying that the rate at which a job seeker encounters a vacancy is determined by 
 The estimated equation follows a log-linear specification: lnh�ti; Uj, Vj, Xi, Zj� = lnA�Xi, Zj� − (1 − β)lnUj + γlnVj + lnφ(ti). 
                                                 
5 If α > 1 (α < 1), the hazard rate is positively (negatively) dependent. 
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labor market tightness, Vj/Uj, but not by the market size. If β + γ = 1 (that is, the 
coefficients of lnUj and lnVj are equal in the absolute term), we support the hypothesis 
of constant returns-to-scale. This ensures that the unemployment rate is uniquely 
determined when flows into and out of the unemployment pool are equal. However, if β 
+ γ > 1, the matching function exhibits increasing returns-to-scale, thus implying that an 
increase in search effort on one side of the stocks encourages the other side of the stocks 
to devote more search effort, as well as to decrease the search cost incurred by the other 
side. This situation leads to multiple-ranked equilibria (Diamond, 1982). 
The estimates also provide the extent of externalities that determine the degree of 
efficiency in the decentralized labor market. For instance, the absolute value of the 
coefficient on lnUj, (1 – β), indicates the extent of congestion externality in the sense 
that the entry of one more unemployed person makes it more competitive for any 
incumbent unemployed to look for a job. Conversely, the coefficient on lnVj (γ) 
indicates the extent of search externality with the entry of one more job vacancy, 
making it less competitive for the unemployed to find a job.6
Although the measures of the unemployed and job vacancies vary over time through 
their continuous inflow and outflow during a spell of unemployment, we treat them as 
time-invariant covariates in our estimation. That is, the local labor market conditions 
 
                                                 
6 The estimate of β measures the search externality with the entry of an unemployed person making 
it less competitive for firms to find an unemployed person, while (1 – γ) indicates the extent of the 
congestion externality in that the entry of a job vacancy lowers the probability of other incumbent 
firms finding an unemployed person. 
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prevailing at the time an individual starts to search for a job serve as the covariates. To 
counter the argument that local labor market conditions at the time an individual starts 
to look for a job are not relevant to the decision of exiting from unemployment after a 
spell of searching for a job, we specify local labor market conditions just one month 
before each individual exits as the time-invariant covariates. For individuals whose spell 
of unemployment is incomplete, we use local labor market conditions at the end of the 
observed interval. 
3. Data 
We employ two administrative micro data sets constructed by the Employment Security 
Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare. The first is the Report on 
Unemployment Insurance. This data set contains the job history of an insured person, 
including the wage previously earned and the actual date when the person resigned from 
his/her employment or lost it between August 1 and August 31, 2005. This data set does 
not include those ineligible for unemployment insurance, including the self-employed, 
housewives, and part-time workers (those working fewer than 20 hours per week). The 
data set also does not include disadvantaged persons and those with a disability.7
                                                 
7 Disadvantaged persons are: (1) persons aged more than 65 years, (2) seasonal workers, (3) daily 
workers, and (4) job seekers who have been unemployed for more than a year. 
 The 
second data set is the Report on Employment Services, which captures the job search 
process conducted by the individuals who quit or lost their job between August 1 and 
August 31, 2005. This data set tracks and monitors the process of job search from the 
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date when a job seeker registered at his/her local employment service office to the date 
when he/she found a job, or the last date in the observed interval (July 13, 2006). 
Both data sets include a common identification (ID) number for each job seeker, and 
this allows us to merge the data sets using the ID number. This data processing 
operation leaves us with only job seekers who are eligible to receive unemployment 
benefits during their job search and have registered at the public employment service 
office and frequently visit to receive benefits. 8
Our concern now moves to the covariates. We begin with the local labor market 
conditions. Two methods are employed to measure the tightness of the local labor 
 Note that those who join the 
unemployment insurance program cannot actually receive benefits without first 
registering with the public employment service office. Because the date an individual 
quit or lost his/her last job does not exactly correspond with the date he/she registered as 
a job seeker at the local employment office, as a robustness check, we use not only the 
date when individuals registered with the employment office but also the date when 
they quit or lost their previous employment as the starting date for job search. Therefore, 
two separate sets of search duration data are available in our estimates. In addition, 
because the Report on Employment Services tracks and monitors job search on a weekly 
basis, the frequency of the search duration data is weekly. 
                                                 
8 Some of the literature focuses on identifying the effect of search methods on the search duration. 
See, for example, Blau and Robin (1990) in the US, Gregg and Wadsworth (1996) in the UK, and 
Addison and Portugal (2002) in Portugal. The public employment service is popular for job 
seekers and productive in forming matches in the UK (Jobcentre), but not in the US and Portugal. 
In this paper, we do not explore which particular search methods are more productive. 
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market. The first is simply to use monthly measures of job seekers and job vacancies in 
a prefecture where an individual resides. The merit of using prefectural data is that we 
can obtain prefectural labor market conditions at the time of just one month before each 
individual exits and at the end of the observed interval, as well as when the individual 
starts to search for a new job. This is because the release of the prefectural-level data on 
job seekers and job vacancies is monthly, allowing us to observe the effect on the exit 
rate of the most recent labor market conditions. However, one problem is that the 
prefectural labor market is so geographically large that it does not necessarily match up 
with the exact area where an individual is actively searching for a job. 
To compensate for this shortcoming, we instead use measures of job seekers and job 
vacancies registered at the local public employment service office where an individual 
registered to receive unemployment benefits. This precisely pins down the labor market 
where individuals are actually looking for a job. It is of course possible that an 
individual actively searches for a job in, for example, an urban area, despite his/her 
registration being with the local employment service office nearest to their suburban 
residence. The main problem of using this method is, additionally, that the aggregate 
data on job seekers and job vacancies registered at each employment service office are 
available only at a yearly frequency. We use the 2005 data on job seekers and job 
vacancies. The data on job seekers and job vacancies in the local labor market (both at 
the prefectural level and in the area administered by the local employment service 
office) are obtained from the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare. 
Unemployment benefits and individual characteristics are crucial covariates 
determining the search duration. This is because we consider these as proxies indicating 
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the extent of job search effort, the level of human capital and the level of the reservation 
wage. As background, we outline the Japanese unemployment insurance system before 
we explain how we include unemployment benefits in the vector of covariates. In sum, 
the unemployed in Japan receive 50–80% of their wage prior to becoming unemployed 
for 90 to 360 days. The amount of benefits and the provision period then depend on the 
person’s age, the length of the insured period, and whether they resigned from their 
previous employment voluntarily or lost their job involuntarily. 
All other things being equal, an employed person receives more generous benefits if 
they are older, if they have become involuntarily unemployed, and/or when insured for a 
longer period. When an unemployed person exits from unemployment at an early stage 
(before the last day for the provision of benefits), the benefits remaining are partially 
paid if certain conditions are met. After the provision of unemployment benefits ends, 
alternative allowances are not available for any unemployed still looking for a job.9
It is expected that the generosity of unemployment benefits affects the level of search 
effort; that is, when benefits are more generous, the unemployed put less effort into 
searching for a job. We employ several dummy variables indicating the types of 
unemployment benefits: 90, 120, 150 days of benefits with voluntary job turnover, and 
90, 120, 180, 240, and more than 240 days of benefits with involuntary job turnover. 
Finally, some individual characteristics are included in the vector of covariates, 
including age, sex, marital status, education, prior job tenure, and the prior wage. These 
 
                                                 
9 In contrast, in Europe, public assistance continues for the unemployed still looking for a job, even 
after the provision of unemployment benefits ends. 
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covariates determine an individual’s level of human capital and the reservation wage. 
The Appendix provides some descriptive statistics. 
4. Results 
4.1 Labor market conditions 
Table 1 reports estimated results of the matching function where prefectural data on job 
seekers and job vacancies as of August 2005 define the local labor market conditions. In 
the first two columns of Table 1, we define the starting date of job search by when an 
individual registered at the local public employment service office, and in the second 
two columns by when they quit or lost their previous job. Columns [1] and [3] provide 
the semiparametric estimates using Cox’s proportional hazard model, while columns [2] 
and [4] present the parametric estimates using a Weibull distribution. 
Regardless of the starting date of job search, the estimated coefficient on job seekers 
is negative while that on job vacancies is positive according to the semiparametric 
estimations (columns [1] and [3]). This is consistent with our expectations. However, 
while the job seekers’ coefficient is significant at the 1% level, the coefficient on job 
vacancies is statistically insignificant. In addition, the former is larger in absolute 
magnitude than the latter, and the sum of these coefficients is less than zero. We 
therefore reject the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients is zero, suggesting that 
the matching function does not exhibit constant returns-to-scale, rather decreasing 
returns-to-scale. This result is inconsistent with the existence of a unique unemployment 
rate along the steady-state growth path (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998; Pissarides, 
2000). 
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However, this result is consistent with the estimated matching functions in Kano and 
Ohta (2005) and Sasaki (2007) when using aggregate data by prefecture.10 Nevertheless, 
Sasaki (2008) still shows that the matching function exhibits constant returns-to-scale 
after correcting for the temporal aggregation bias that arises when discrete-time data are 
used to estimate a continuous-time matching formation.11,12 Ueno et al. (2004) also 
estimate the job matching function by including the individual characteristics of job 
seekers, and they conclude that the matching function exhibits constant 
returns-to-scale.13 Lastly, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) survey the international 
literature and summarize on this basis that the job matching function across countries 
and over time generally exhibits constant returns-to-scale.14
In columns [1] and [3], the elasticity of job matches with respect to job seekers lies 
within the range 0.765–0.778, while the elasticity with respect to job vacancies is 
relatively smaller in magnitude, from 0.070 to 0.084. This implies that an additional job 
  
                                                 
10 Kano and Ohta (2005) find that β + γ = 0862 and Sasaki (2007) that β + γ = 0.830. This is 
apparently despite some differences in sampling, where Kano and Ohta (2005) include regional 
data from 1973 to 1999 and Sasaki (2007) uses quarterly regional data from 1998 q1 to 2007 q1. 
11 Sasaki (2008) suggests that the matching function formation should be nonrandom (stock–flow 
matching); however, the estimation advantage appears trivial. 
12 Burdett et al. (1994) and Coles and Petrongolo (2008) both show how to correct for the temporal 
aggregation bias. 
13 This study covers data from 1991 to 2001. 
14 Yet other studies find that the matching function exhibits increasing returns-to-scale (Blanchard 
and Diamond, 1989; Yashiv, 2000). 
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vacancy has only a minor effect on the probability of forming a job match. 
Similar results are obtained in the parametric estimations with a Weibull distribution, 
as shown in columns [2] and [4] in Table 1. This part of the analysis shows that the 
hazard rate of a job seeker is negatively dependent, implying that the exit rate of a job 
seeker from unemployment becomes lower as the search duration becomes longer. In 
turn, this suggests that job seekers are more likely to become long-term unemployed, at 
least partly because the job seekers’ human capital depreciates as the duration of 
unemployment becomes longer. 
Table 2 provides the estimated results of the matching function using the data on 
prefectural labor conditions either one month before the job seeker exited from 
unemployment or at the end of the observed interval (July 13, 2006). As shown in 
columns [1] and [3] of the semiparametric estimations, job vacancies have a positive 
impact on search duration at the 5% level of significance, while job seekers maintain a 
negative effect at the 1% level of significance. As in Table 1, the sum of the coefficients 
on lnUj and lnVj is negative, thus indicating that the matching function exhibits 
decreasing but not constant returns-to-scale. 
However, unlike the estimates in Table 1, the magnitudes of these coefficients are 
larger in the sense that the elasticity of job match to job seekers is smaller (0.399–0.510), 
while the elasticity with respect to vacancies is larger (0.287–0.381). Given the 
difference in data sampling between these two sets of estimates, this implies that search 
and congestion externalities are larger when we specify data one month before a job 
match or at the end of the interval, and but in August 2005. The reason why the 
externalities are small using the data as of August 2005 is as follows. An increase in job 
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vacancies in August 2005 increases the likelihood that a job seeker exits from 
unemployment, but may also discourage the job seeker from job search hastily because 
he/she believes many vacancies remain available. We expect the latter effect to 
relatively dominate when job search activity begins in August 2005, while the former 
effect relatively dominates one month before the formation of a job match. 
We can interpret an increase in the coefficient on lnUj in a similar manner. Because 
job seekers are not very serious in searching for a job as of August 2005 when search 
activity actually begins, the entry of an additional job seeker does not generate a serious 
congestion externality for other job seekers. However, because job seekers become 
gradually more serious in searching for a job as they keep searching, the entry of an 
additional job seeker generates a large congestion externality for incumbent job seekers. 
The inclusion of independent variables indicating a job seeker’s individual 
characteristics should help control for the extent of individual search effort to some 
degree, but it apparently does not do this perfectly.  
Regardless of the starting date of job search, the same results are obtained in the 
parametric estimations with a Weibull distribution, as shown in columns [2] and [4] of 
Table 2. As in Table 1, the hazard rate of a job seeker is negatively dependent, thereby 
indicating that in the Japanese labor market, the longer-term unemployed have greater 
difficulty in exiting from unemployment. 
Table 3 presents the estimated matching function where job seekers and job vacancies 
registered at each employment service office in 2005 are used as the local labor market 
conditions. As a result, the labor market where a job seeker is actively searching is 
defined by the area administered by the local employment service office at which they 
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registered for employment. Note that we specify yearly data for 2005. Despite these 
differences in sampling, the estimated results are close to those in Table 2 in the sense 
that the coefficient on job vacancies remains positive at the 5% level of significance, 
while the coefficient on job seekers remains negative at the 1% level of significance. 
Moreover, the sum of these coefficients is also negative, again indicating that the 
matching function exhibits decreasing returns-to-scale. 
The results are also similar to those in Table 1 in the sense that the search and 
congestion externalities are both relatively small when we specify yearly data for 2005 
from the local labor market as administered by the local employment service office. 
Because the data on local labor market conditions are weighted averages from January 
to December 2005, the discouraged job seeker effect—in the sense that an additional 
vacancy discourages a job seeker from beginning job search hastily and that an 
additional job seeker does not yet generate a serious congestion externality to other job 
seekers—is relatively strong, and this reduces the magnitude of these externalities. 
According to the parametric estimates with a Weibull distribution (columns [2] and 
[4] in Table 3), the hazard rate remains negatively dependent, when the starting date of 
job search is defined as when an individual registered with the public employment 
service office (column [2]). However, it becomes positively dependent when we specify 
the date at which an individual quit or lost his/her job as the starting date of job search 
(column [4]). 
Overall, Tables 1–3 provide robust results indicating that the matching function 
exhibits decreasing returns-to-scale, thereby implying that doubling the number of job 
seekers and job vacancies delivers fewer than twice as many job matches. One of the 
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possible reasons for this is negative scale effects at the level of the local labor market. 
For instance, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2006) hypothesize that a larger market size 
increases productivity on average to support increasing returns-to-scale at the structural 
level. Our view is contrast with Petrongolo and Pissarides (2006) in that a larger market 
size somehow decreases productivity on average, possibly because the limited number 
of staff at employment service offices cannot efficiently coordinate productive job 
matching formations between too many unemployed and job vacancies. Alternatively, it 
could be because the transfer of job information in a larger market to both the 
unemployed and firms is not as efficient, resulting in unproductive job matches (or 
mismatches). A decrease in productivity then shifts downward the wage offer 
distribution, thereby discouraging job seekers from forming a match with an 
encountered firm. A countereffect is that lower productivity decreases the reservation 
wage of job seekers, encouraging them to exit from unemployment. Based on our 
estimates, we thus conclude that the former effect dominates the latter, thereby leading 
to decreasing returns-to-scale. 
4.2 Unemployment benefits 
This subsection focuses on the effects of unemployment benefits on a job seeker’s 
search behavior. Tables 1–3 provide the estimated results, assuming that the reference 
dummy is “the provision of benefits for 90 days because of voluntary turnover”. While 
some of the results obtained are qualitatively alike in these tables, the effects differ to 
some extent by the level of significance. One noteworthy finding is that according to the 
parametric and semiparametric estimates of the duration analysis in columns [1]–[4], 
job seekers who resign (are removed) from their previous employment voluntarily 
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(involuntarily) are less (more) likely to exit from unemployment. In particular, those 
who lose their previous job involuntarily and are eligible to receive benefits for 120 
days are the quickest to exit from unemployment. In addition, even though job seekers 
are eligible to receive benefits for more than 90 days, those job seekers who quit their 
job against their own will are generally eager to get back to work as soon as possible. 
Focusing attention on job seekers who quit their previous job voluntarily, we can see 
that generous benefits encourage them to spend more time looking for a job, and this 
extends the duration of unemployment. This is consistent with the predictions of the 
benchmark search model. We can interpret this result as meaning that unemployment 
benefits lower matching effectiveness in the sense that it takes more time to form a 
match between a job seeker and a job vacancy. 
However, we should also note that matching effectiveness is not only measured by 
the time it takes to form a match (the search duration) but also by the wage rate earned 
after matching with a new firm and the length of tenure experienced at the new firm. To 
account for this, we predict that greater benefits increase an individual’s reservation 
wage, leading to both a longer duration of unemployment and a higher wage if 
eventually hired at a new firm. There are, of course, trade-offs in terms of matching 
effectiveness between the duration of unemployment and the expected wage at the new 
firm (or matching quality). In terms of work in this area, Kohara et al. (2010) explores 
the effect of the unemployment insurance system on matching effectiveness as 
measured by the length of tenure at a newly matched firm, using the same micro data as 
the present analysis. 
4.3 Other covariates 
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Finally, we report on the extent to which individual characteristics affect the exit rate 
from unemployment (the duration of job search). The covariates include proxies 
indicating the level of human capital, the reservation wage, and the search effort. Once 
again, many of the results are common in Tables 1–3. To start with, compared with 
married women, single women and single and married men are more likely to exit from 
unemployment. This supports the notion that the reservation wage of married women is 
relatively high because these women receive income earned exogenously by their 
husbands and because the customary division of labor in Japan (husbands concentrating 
on market work while wives specializing in household duties) may remain prevalent. 
We also find that the more educated find a new job at earlier stages of the job search 
process. One intuition behind this result is that because the more educated incur a 
greater burden of the opportunity cost of being unemployed, they put more effort into 
searching for a job. In addition, a higher wage in the previous job also induces job 
seekers to exit from the unemployment pool more quickly. We interpret this as meaning 
much the same, namely, that the more educated who are expected to receive a higher 
wage in their previous job incur a higher opportunity cost of being unemployed. 
Finally, job seekers who are older or have enjoyed longer tenure in their previous job 
are less likely to exit from unemployment. This could be because they are skillful 
enough to set their reservation wage sufficiently high. Alternatively, it could be because 
as they have worked longer, they have saved sufficient funds, which allows them to 
delay the process of finding a new job. 
5. Concluding remarks 
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Using administrative job search micro data from the Japanese Ministry of Health, 
Labour, and Welfare, this paper estimates matching functions to measure the extent of 
search frictions in the Japanese labor market and presents a duration analysis to 
elucidate the effect of unemployment benefits on a job seeker’s behavior. It is important 
to note that the administrative data are extremely valuable in that they track the job 
search process of job seekers who resigned from their employment or lost it in August 
2005 and subsequently registered at one of the local public employment service offices 
located throughout Japan. Because these are administrative micro data sets, neither 
aggregate, sample selection nor geographical bias potentially arises. This is the first 
research attempt known to use this particular data set for the purpose outlined in this 
paper. 
We found that the matching function does not exhibit constant but rather decreasing 
returns-to-scale with respect to the numbers of job seekers and job vacancies. This result 
is consistent with Kano and Ohta (2005) and Sasaki (2008) who estimate matching 
functions in Japan using aggregate data. According to the duration analysis using a 
Weibull distribution, we also find that the hazard rate of a job seeker is negatively 
dependent, implying that the longer-term unemployed have more difficulty in exiting 
from unemployment, partly because of the depreciation of human capital during the 
period unemployed. 
Another finding is that more generous unemployment benefits extend the search 
duration of job seekers who quit their previous job voluntarily. In contrast, job seekers 
who lost their job involuntarily are more likely to return to work, thereby shortening the 
duration of unemployment. This is perhaps because the involuntarily unemployed may 
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exhibit a greater preference for work and therefore put more effort into searching for a 
new job, even though they are technically eligible to receive more generous 
unemployment benefits. 
A number of policy implications concerning matching effectiveness arise from our 
analysis. To start with, because the matching function exhibits decreasing 
returns-to-scale, fewer than twice the number of job matches result from double the 
numbers of job seekers and job vacancies. This implies that mismatch between job 
seekers and job vacancies lowers matching effectiveness. To reduce the incidence of job 
mismatch, advertisements for job vacancies could be more frequent and more accurate. 
Job training with the unemployed could also focus on instilling the skills firms are 
seeking. Alternatively, as far as the available budget permits, an increase in the number 
of staff in public employment service offices could encourage more productive (not 
mismatched) coordination between job seekers and job vacancies. Finally, the negative 
dependency of the hazard rate shows that it takes more time for an individual who has 
been unemployed longer to leave the unemployment pool. This suggests the need to 
implement a policy that targets the long-term unemployed to make them sufficiently 
skillful to get a job as soon as possible. 
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Table 1
Estimations of the matching function using the prefectural data
Search duration
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Cox Weibull Cox Weibull
ln(vacancies) 0.070 0.079 0.084 0.085
(0.069) (0.071) (0.061) (0.062)
ln(job seekers) -0.222 *** -0.234 *** -0.235 *** -0.238 ***
(0.080) (0.083) (0.072) (0.073)
ln(age) -0.521 *** -0.540 *** -0.377 *** -0.387 ***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Single man 0.519 *** 0.523 *** 0.556 *** 0.565 ***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031)
Single woman 0.465 *** 0.469 *** 0.516 *** 0.527 ***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Married man 0.859 *** 0.870 *** 0.873 *** 0.885 ***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
ln(education yrs) 0.386 *** 0.399 *** 0.417 *** 0.434 ***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.035) (0.036)
ln(prev. tenure) -0.118 *** -0.121 *** -0.160 *** -0.160 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
ln(prev. wage) 0.068 *** 0.068 *** 0.060 *** 0.063 ***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)
UI benefits
120 days with -0.034 ** -0.035 ** -0.025 * -0.025 *
voluntary quit (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
150 days with -0.168 *** -0.176 *** -0.151 *** -0.151 ***
voluntary quit (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
90 days with 0.025 0.021 0.001 0.004
involuntary quit (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
120 days with 0.188 *** 0.193 *** 0.230 *** 0.237 ***
involuntary quit (0.049) (0.051) (0.049) (0.051)
180 days with 0.112 *** 0.110 *** 0.095 *** 0.100 ***
involuntary quit (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
240 days with 0.067 ** 0.063 * 0.103 *** 0.107 ***
involuntary quit (0.034) (0.035) (0.032) (0.033)
More than 240 days with 0.057 ** 0.050 * 0.105 *** 0.106 ***
involuntary quit (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Constant -2.868 *** -3.488 ***
(0.281) (0.254)
Dependency 0.935 0.959
Log-likelihood -674075 -151058 -810689 -174887
Wald Chi2 4334.69 4512.32 5923.91 5806.78
F-value
N 119115 119115 135347 135347
*** 1% ** 5% * 10% significant
[1][2]: The search duration is from the date when a job seeker registered at the employment
service office to when he/she found a job, or July 13, 2006. [3][4]: The search duration is
from the date when a job seeker left or lost his/her previous job to when he/she found a job,
or July 13, 2006. The numbers of job seekers and job vacancies are measured when a job
seeker starts to look for a job (August, 2005).
28
Table 2
Estimations of the matching function using the prefectural data
Search duration
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Cox Weibull Cox Weibull
ln(vacancies) 0.381 ** 0.399 ** 0.287 ** 0.301 **
(0.154) (0.158) (0.131) (0.136)
ln(job seekers) -0.601 *** -0.624 *** -0.490 *** -0.510 ***
(0.198) (0.204) (0.168) (0.174)
ln(age) -0.522 *** -0.542 *** -0.381 *** -0.392 ***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022)
Single man 0.528 *** 0.533 *** 0.560 *** 0.570 ***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030)
Single woman 0.468 *** 0.472 *** 0.518 *** 0.529 ***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Married man 0.869 *** 0.880 *** 0.878 *** 0.891 ***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
ln(education yrs) 0.358 *** 0.371 *** 0.399 *** 0.415 ***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.037) (0.038)
ln(prev. tenure) -0.127 *** -0.131 *** -0.163 *** -0.163 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007)
ln(prev. wage) 0.041 ** 0.041 ** 0.044 ** 0.045 **
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
UI benefits
120 days with -0.028 ** -0.029 ** -0.024 * -0.024
voluntary quit (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
150 days with -0.169 *** -0.177 *** -0.153 *** -0.153 ***
voluntary quit (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
90 days with 0.038 * 0.035 0.013 0.016
involuntary quit (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
120 days with 0.203 *** 0.208 *** 0.239 *** 0.247 ***
involuntary quit (0.049) (0.051) (0.049) (0.050)
180 days with 0.127 *** 0.125 *** 0.107 *** 0.112 ***
involuntary quit (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026)
240 days with 0.087 *** 0.084 ** 0.116 *** 0.120 ***
involuntary quit (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033)
More than 240 days with 0.079 *** 0.072 ** 0.118 *** 0.120 ***
involuntary quit (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
Constant (0.028) -1.829 *** -2.730 ***
(0.572) (0.488)
Dependency 0.940 0.963
Log-likelihood -673427 -150362   -810193 -174351
Wald Chi2 4599.96 4774.58 5182.39 5130.28
F-value
N 119115 119115 135347 135347
*** 1% ** 5% * 10% significant
[1][2]: The search duration is from the date when a job seeker registered at the employment
service office to when he/she found a job, or July 13, 2006. [3][4]: The search duration is
from the date when a job seeker left or lost his/her previous job to the when he/she found a
job, or July 13, 2006. The numbers of job seekers and job vacancies are measured just one
month before the job seeker found a job, or at the end of the interval (July 13, 2006).
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Table 3
Estimations of the matching function using the data of employment service office
Search duration
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Cox Weibull Cox Weibull
ln(vacancies) 0.061 ** 0.064 *** 0.064 *** 0.064 **
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
ln(job seekers) -0.192 *** -0.197 *** -0.199 *** -0.204 ***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
ln(age) -0.518 *** -0.538 *** -0.456 *** -0.472 ***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Single man 0.524 *** 0.528 *** 0.598 *** 0.613 ***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Single woman 0.469 *** 0.473 *** 0.550 *** 0.567 ***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Married man 0.871 *** 0.882 *** 0.948 *** 0.971 ***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
ln(education yrs) 0.406 *** 0.420 *** 0.429 *** 0.453 ***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
ln(prev. tenure) -0.122 *** -0.125 *** -0.115 *** -0.117 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ln(prev. wage) 0.049 *** 0.049 *** 0.039 *** 0.040 ***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
UI benefits
120 days with -0.034 ** -0.035 ** -0.022 -0.020
voluntary quit (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
150 days with -0.169 *** -0.177 *** -0.144 *** -0.144 ***
voluntary quit (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
90 days with 0.022 0.018 ** 0.078 *** 0.080 ***
involuntary quit (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
120 days with 0.191 *** 0.195 *** 0.246 *** 0.258 ***
involuntary quit (0.049) (0.051) (0.050) (0.052)
180 days with 0.096 *** 0.093 *** 0.148 *** 0.153 ***
involuntary quit (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
240 days with 0.077 ** 0.072 ** 0.127 *** 0.134 ***
involuntary quit (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
More than 240 days with 0.056 * 0.048 0.103 *** 0.106 ***
involuntary quit (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Constant -3.351 *** -4.801 ***
(0.157) (0.159)
Dependency 0.936 1.106
Log-likelihood -636154 -143350 -638947 -134598
Wald Chi2 6637.32 6722.15 6590.83 6563.28
F-value
N 113219 113219 113363 113363
*** 1% ** 5% * 10% significant
[1][2]: The search duration is from the date when a job seeker registered at the employment
service office to when he/she found a job, or July 13, 2006. [3][4]: The search duration is
from the date when a job seeker left or lost his/her previous job to when she found a job, or
July 13, 2006. The numbers of job seekers and job vacancies registered at each employment
service office are measured in 2005.
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Appendix Table 1
Descriptive statistics (prefectural data, the date when starting to look for a job)
N Average Std. Dev. Min Max
Search duration 150391 197.488 110.479 0 365
Proportion of those who find a job 150391 0.510 0.500 0 1
within the interval
Individual characteristics
Age 150391 39.128 12.914 16 65
Single man 150391 0.228 0.419 0 1
Single woman 150391 0.280 0.449 0 1
Married man 150391 0.229 0.420 0 1
Married woman 150391 0.263 0.440 0 1
Education years 121641 12.288 1.891 9 18
Tenure of the previous jobs (days) 150391 2426.850 3009.704 7 18043
Previous wage (monthly thousands) 147351 187.724 112.608 1 9190
UI benefits
90 days with voluntary quit 150391 0.618 0.486 0 1
120 days with voluntary quit 150391 0.108 0.310 0 1
150 days with voluntary quit 150391 0.148 0.355 0 1
90 days with involuntary quit 150391 0.041 0.198 0 1
120 days with involuntary quit 150391 0.005 0.069 0 1
180 days with involuntary quit 150391 0.030 0.172 0 1
240 days with involuntary quit 150391 0.024 0.153 0 1
More than 240 days with 150391 0.026 0.159 0 1
involuntary quit
Local labor market
Prefectural data 
When starting for a job
Job vacancies 150391 90351.02 85327.71 8492 343101
Job seekers 150391 83438.51 59384.25 10986 237491
One month before when finding a job
Job vacancies 150391 92170.14 86291.82 8497 343101
Job seekers 150391 83429.04 59118.20 10986 222826
The search duration is from the date when a job seeker registered at the employment service office to
when he/she found a job, or the end of the interval (July 13, 2006). The numbers of job seekers and
job vacancies are measured from the prefectural data. We here limit the data on job seekers who
found a job within one year.
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Appendix Table 2
Descriptive statistics (prefectural data, the date when leaving or losing the previous job)
N Average Std. Dev. Min Max
Search duration 170516 218.961 116.2091 1 346
Proportion of those who find a job 170516 0.532 0.499 0 1
within the interval
Individual characteristics
Age 170516 38.841 12.835 16 64
Single man 170516 0.230 0.421 0 1
Single woman 170516 0.284 0.451 0 1
Married man 170516 0.229 0.420 0 1
Married woman 170516 0.257 0.437 0 1
Education years 137993 12.298 1.885 9 18
Tenure of the previous jobs (days) 170489 2209.864 2946.843 1 18043
Previous wage (monthly thousands) 167358 188.011 110.782 1 9190
UI benefits
90 days with voluntary quit 170516 0.663 0.473 0 1
120 days with voluntary quit 170516 0.095 0.294 0 1
150 days with voluntary quit 170516 0.130 0.337 0 1
90 days with involuntary quit 170516 0.036 0.187 0 1
120 days with involuntary quit 170516 0.004 0.065 0 1
180 days with involuntary quit 170516 0.027 0.161 0 1
240 days with involuntary quit 170516 0.021 0.144 0 1
More than 240 days with 170516 0.023 0.149 0 1
involuntary quit
Local labor market
Prefectural data 
When leaving or losing the prior job
Job vacancies 170516 86926.74 81836.80 8790 307820
Job seekers 170516 84236.61 60045.03 13091 219737
One month before when finding a job
Job vacancies 170516 91478.67 85849.61 8497 343101
Job seekers 170516 83235.24 58931.52 10986 222826
The search duration is from the date when a job seeker left or lost the previous job to when he/she
found a job, or the end of the interval (July 13, 2006). The numbers of job seekers and job vacancies
are measured from the prefectural data. We here limit the data on job seekers who found a job within
one year.
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Appendix Table 3
Descriptive statistics (data from employment service office, the date when starting 
to look for a job)
N Average Std. Dev. Min Max
Search duration 143494 197.807 110.385 0 365
Proportion of those who find a job 143494 0.509 0.500 0 1
within the interval
Individual characteristics
Age 143494 39.086 12.900 16 65
Single man 143494 0.228 0.419 0 1
Single woman 143494 0.281 0.450 0 1
Married man 143494 0.228 0.419 0 1
Married woman 143494 0.263 0.440 0 1
Education years 115625 12.298 1.894 9 18
Tenure of the previous jobs (days) 143494 2419.786 3008.113 7 18043
Previous wage (monthly thousands) 140586 188.227 113.376 1 9190
UI benefits
90 days with voluntary quit 143494 0.620 0.485 0 1
120 days with voluntary quit 143494 0.108 0.310 0 1
150 days with voluntary quit 143494 0.148 0.355 0 1
90 days with involuntary quit 143494 0.041 0.198 0 1
120 days with involuntary quit 143494 0.005 0.068 0 1
180 days with involuntary quit 143494 0.030 0.171 0 1
240 days with involuntary quit 143494 0.024 0.152 0 1
More than 240 days with 143494 0.025 0.157 0 1
involuntary quit
Local labor market
Data from employment service offices
When starting for a job
Job vacancies (2005 average) 143494 110671.30 108264.00 3159 782957
Job seekers (2005 average) 143494 107607.50 72852.77 4677 314853
The search duration is from the date when a job seeker registered at the employment service office to
when he/she found a job, or the end of the interval (July 13, 2006). The numbers of job seekers and job
vacancies are measured from each employment service office. We here limit the data on[ job seekers
who found a job within one year.
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Appendix Table 4
Descriptive statistics (data from employment service office, the date when leaving or losing 
the previous job)
N Average Std. Dev. Min Max
Search duration 143677 228.490 110.728 1 346
Proportion of those who find a job 143677 0.508 0.500 0 1
within the interval
Individual characteristics
Age 143677 38.968 12.901 16 64
Single man 143677 0.228 0.419 0 1
Single woman 143677 0.282 0.450 0 1
Married man 143677 0.228 0.419 0 1
Married woman 143677 0.263 0.440 0 1
Education years 115769 12.298 1.894 9 18
Tenure of the previous jobs (days) 143677 2419.031 3007.740 7 18043
Previous wage (monthly thousands) 140767 188.223 113.351 1 9190
UI benefits
90 days with voluntary quit 143677 0.620 0.485 0 1
120 days with voluntary quit 143677 0.108 0.310 0 1
150 days with voluntary quit 143677 0.147 0.355 0 1
90 days with involuntary quit 143677 0.041 0.198 0 1
120 days with involuntary quit 143677 0.005 0.068 0 1
180 days with involuntary quit 143677 0.030 0.171 0 1
240 days with involuntary quit 143677 0.024 0.152 0 1
More than 240 days with 143677 0.025 0.157 0 1
involuntary quit
Local labor market
Data from employment service offices
When leaving or losing the prior job
Job vacancies (2005 average) 143677 110493.80 108110.00 3225 782957
jJb seekers (2005 average) 143677 107879.60 73059.33 4677 314853
The search duration is from the date when a job seeker left or lost the previous job to when he/she
found a job, or the end of the interval (July 13, 2006). The numbers of job seekers and job vacancies
are measured from each employment service. We here limit the data on job seekers who found a job
within one year.office.
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